This paper studies the dynamics of the traveler's day-to-day route adjustment process in the general transportation network with fixed or elastic demand and homogeneous or heterogeneous users. Each traveler is assumed to adjust his/her route choice according to the excess travel cost between the instantaneous experienced travel cost and a certain referred level, which induces an aggregate path flow dynamics. We call the path flow dynamics the excess travel cost dynamics, which corresponds to the excess payoff dynamics in evolutionary games and serves a general framework of modeling the homogeneous or heterogeneous route choice behavior of travelers.
Introduction
Network equilibrium models have a long history, both in the transport research literature and in practical studies of scheme assessment, since the notion of user equilibrium UE was proposed 1 . At equilibrium, all travelers on the same origin-destination pair experience the same travel cost, while all unused routes have equal or higher travel costs. Wardrop equilibrium has been extended in different senses to address real world needs in transportation planning, analysis, and management, including stochastic user equilibrium SUE to allow imperfect information or user perception error in their route choice 2 ; dynamic user equilibrium within-day to incorporate the departure time choice in route choice 3, 4 . To model the travelers' response to exogenous information, the growing interest in day-to-day dynamics has received much study after the original research of Horowitz 5 , in which a two-link transportation network is adopted to explain the day-to-day dynamic system stability over a set of equilibrium solutions rather than an isolated point 20 has been adopted by several researchers to study the stability of dynamic transportation network 6, 17, 21 . In this study, we use LaSalle's theorem to study the stability of the excess travel cost dynamics. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the definition of the excess travel cost dynamics. The stability issue for the proposed dynamic system is addressed in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 4. 
Day-to-Day Dynamical Route Adjustment Process

Excess Travel Cost Dynamics with Homogeneous Users
2.1
Denote the day-to-day path flow dynamics byḟ s ḟ w r s , r ∈ R w , w ∈ W , say, the derivative of path flow vector f s with respect to day to day time s.
Three assumptions on travelers' route adjustment process are proposed and compared by Nagurney and Zhang 11 . The third one among those assumptions is suggested to be the most reasonable and defined by Yang and Zhang 15 as the rational behavior adjustment process RBAP with fixed demand. The day-to-day route choice adjustment process is the RBAP with fixed travel demand if the aggregated travel cost of the entire network decreases based on the previous day's path travel costs when path flows change from day to day; otherwise, if path flow becomes stationary over day, then it is equivalent to the user equilibrium path flow. That is to say, if the current path flow pattern is not UE path flow, then w∈W r∈R w C w r f ḟ w r < 0. The RBAP is mild and includes various commonly used route choice adjustment process as its special cases, such as the proportional-switch adjustment process 17 , the projected dynamical system 11 , and the Brown-von NeumannNash dynamics 22 .
Suppose that a well-defined excess travel cost is associated with each path, such as the difference between the travel cost and the average travel cost corresponding to a specific OD pair. It is easy to check that, both the aggregated travel cost and excess travel cost of the entire network decreases based on the previous day's path travel costs when path flow pattern changes from day to day, whenever the process is RBAP. The logic is intuitive since the flow process follows the conservation constraint if the excess travel cost is defined as the difference between the path cost and average OD-specific travel cost, namely, 
2.3
The day-to-day route adjustment process 2.3 is the excess travel cost dynamics if the following three conditions are satisfied:
A1 dynamic system 2.3 admits a unique solution trajectory for any given initial condition, and the trajectory is Lipschitz continuous; With the excess travel cost dynamics, the aggregated excess travel cost of the entire network must decrease from the previous day's path travel costs when path flows change from day to day; otherwise, if path flow becomes stationary over days, then it is equivalent to the user equilibrium path flow. Define the excess payoff for using each path as −ETC, then the excess travel cost dynamics is the excess payoff dynamics, which is a special case of the well-behaved dynamics proposed by Sandholm 19 .
Excess Travel Cost Dynamics with Heterogeneous Users
The excess travel cost dynamics, described above, assumes that all travelers perceive the path travel cost identically travel time plus a discount monetary cost . However, it is well known that travelers may value travel time differently, depending on their income levels or travel purposes. Thus, when a toll policy is introduced into the network, heterogeneous users with different value of time VOT have to be considered in converting travel time into equivalent monetary cost. In this subsection, we focus our discussion on the behavior assumption of Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5 the route choice adjustment process in presence of the user heterogeneity. Furthermore, we consider a discrete set of user classes corresponding to the groups of users with different socioeconomic characteristics, such as income level.
Let M denote such user classes, and β m , β m > 0, be the average VOT for users of class m ∈ M. The travelers of each class adjust their routes according to their owner perception for any given and fixed link toll pattern, τ {τ a , a ∈ A}. Let T w r f and τ w r denote the travel time and toll of path r ∈ R w between OD pair w ∈ W, where we further suppose that each OD pair and user class is associated with a fixed or elastic demand. In the latter case, the classic-specific demand is given by a strictly decreasing function q Assumption A2 says that, for any given and fixed link toll pattern, τ {τ a , a ∈ A}, each user adjusts his/her route choice according to his/her own preference, which results in the decrease in aggregated excess travel cost of the entire network in time unit in comparison with that on previous day when path flows change from day to day. A stronger behavior assumption is that the flow on those paths on which travelers experienced positive excess travel cost strictly decreases, and vice versa. Assumption A2 is a direct extension of the homogeneous case, in which all travelers have an identical VOT.
Example 2.1. The proportional-switch adjustment process PSAP was first introduced by Smith 8 to suppose that the drivers on a higher cost path switch to other lower cost paths in a rate that is proportional to the cost difference between this path and the other lower cost paths. Peeta 
2.8
Like the case with fixed demand again, the PASP with elastic demand, given by 2.8 , can be extended to the multiclass PSAP indexed by user class m ∈ M. Following the method described above and the definition of the excess travel cost with multiclass users, the Brown and von Neumann process can be extended to the cases with elastic demand and user heterogeneity.
Stability of the Excess Travel Cost Dynamics
The stability is a central issue for the dynamic system analysis. Peeta and Yang 17 investigated the system stability over a set of desirable states rather than an isolated point, applying LaSalle's invariant set theorem for the dynamic traffic assignment problem with fixed demand by assuming the proportional-switch adjustment process, given by 2.5 . The objective functions of the system optimum and user equilibrium problem are adopted as the Lyapunov functions to conduct the stability analysis, which is physically meaningful. Similar method of constructing Lyapunov function is also used by Jin 21 to examine the system stability of the dynamic traffic assignment problem under OD first-in-first-out violation Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7 situation. In this section, in a similar spirit of 17 , the system stability of the excess travel cost dynamics proposed in Section 2 is addressed. A set Π is an invariant set of dynamic system 2.3 if every system trajectory which starts from a point in Π remains in Π for all future time 20 . For instant, any equilibrium point of system 2.3 or, F f 0, as a set is an invariant set. LaSalle's invariant set theorem is stated as the follows. Let S {x ∈ R n |V x 0} and Π is the largest invariant set contained in S, namely, Π is the union of all invariant sets within S. Then every solution x s is bounded and converges to Π.
The standard LaSalle's invariant set theorem described above is in general not applicable in the case of discontinuous right-hand side, such as, projected dynamic system 11 and the network tatonnement process 10 . In this case, the generalized invariant set theorem 23 is applicable, only requiring the existence, uniqueness, and continuity of the solution of dynamic system that are guaranteed by assumption A1 . In this study, the standard LaSalle's invariant set theorem is adopted to investigate the stability issues of dynamic system 2.3 .
Stability Property of the Dynamic System with Homogeneous Users
It is well known that the user equilibrium path flow pattern with elastic fixed demand can be identified by solving the following typical elastic fixed demand traffic assignment problem w · is strictly decreasing and t a · is strictly increasing, we know that the Wardrop user equilibrium link flow pattern is unique for the case with fixed demand, and the UE demand level is also unique for the case with elastic demand. Denote the set of user equilibrium path flow patterns as where v {v a , a ∈ A} and q {q w , w ∈ W} are unique UE link flow pattern and corresponding OD demand vector, respectively. It is must be pointed out that, for the case 8 Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society with fixed demand, q is the OD demand matrix, and thus, definition 3.3 is suit for both cases with fixed and elastic demand. We first prove that the set 3.3 is an invariant set of system 2.3 , that is to say, if any solution with an initial state in set Π will reside in Π for ever, which is depicted in the following lemma. Π, defined by 3.3 , is an invariant set of system 2.3 , namely, f 0 ∈ Π implies that f s ∈ Π, for all s ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.2. The set
Proof. From assumptions A2 -A3 , we know that F f / 0 ⇒ ETC f • F f < 0 and, conversely, ETC f • F f 0 ⇒ F f 0, which implies that f is an equilibrium point. It is clear that Π {f ∈ Ω : ETC f 0} {f ∈ Ω : F f 0} is an invariant set of system 2.3 . The proof is completed.
From Lemma 3.2, we now investigate the stability of system 2.3 . Proof. Consider the following continuously differentiable function we only consider the case with elastic demand :
where L is the objective function of mathematical programming problem 3.1 ; q w , w ∈ W, and v a , a ∈ A, are functions of path flow pattern f. Let S {f ∈ R n |V f 0}, and from Lemma 3.2, the largest invariant set contained in S is Π. In fact, Π S since S is the solution set of the minimization problem 3.1 . Furthermore, note that V f > 0 for all f ∈ Ω \ S, and V f 0 for all f ∈ S. Therefore V f is a Lyapunov function candidate of system 2.3 . Taking derivative of V f in day-to-day time, and from assumption A2 , we get, for all f ∈ Ω,
which implies that V f is a Lyapunov function of system 2.3 . According to the LaSalle's invariant set theorem, we know that all solutions of system 2.3 converge to Π, which induces the UE link flow pattern. For the case with fixed demand, we can also show that the derivative of V f is nonpositive since r∈R wḟ w r 0 according to the flow conservation condition. The proof is completed.
The rational behaviour adjustment process proposed by Yang and Zhang 15 is a useful concept frame to model the rational behaviour of the travellers under which the route adjustment process must reduce the aggregate total travel cost of the whole network day by day. However, the definition is suitable only for the case with fixed demand. More generally, the excess travel cost dynamics, or, excess payoff dynamics introduced by Sandholm 19 can incorporate the cases with fixed and elastic demand. Theorem 3.3 depicts that for the excess travel cost dynamics satisfying assumptions A1 -A3 , any dynamic path flow pattern must move to a certain UE path flow pattern, which induces the UE link flow pattern. Therefore, the set of all UE path flow patterns is a stable invariant set. Furthermore, for any given link toll pattern, τ {τ a , a ∈ A}, the travel cost of path r ∈ R w between OD pair w ∈ W is the full travel cost the time cost plus the monetary cost , and the excess travel cost can be defined similarly as the case τ 0, namely, C induces the unique link flow pattern, v i 1 for all links, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The proportionalswitch adjustment process 2.5 is expressed as
where
Using MATLAB Simulink, the behavior of the dynamic system 3.7 starting from 500 randomly selected initial states in the all feasible domain is shown in Figure 2 . It is clear that, for the path flow dynamic system 3.7 , the equilibrium states consist of a set rather than an isolated equilibrium point is an invariant set, and no equilibrium state is stable for path flow pattern in the sense of Lyapunov stability although the link flow is stable.
Stability Property of the Dynamic System with Heterogeneous Users
We now move to examine the system stability when the travelers are heterogeneous in valuation of travel time. It is well known 24 that the static multiclass traffic assignment problem with fixed demand can be formulated as the following equivalent minimization problem where the feasible path flow set Ω is given by 2. From the proof of Lemma 3.2, we know that S {f ∈ R n |V f 0} is the largest invariant set of multiclass dynamic system 2.3 , which is the solution of minimization problem 3.9 . Note that V f > 0 for all f ∈ Ω, and V f 0 for all f ∈ S. Therefore V f is a Lyapunov function candidate of system 2.3 . Furthermore, from the assumption A2 and the flow conservation where v {v a , a ∈ A} and q M {q m w , w ∈ W, m ∈ M} are unique aggregate UE link flow pattern and class-specific OD demand vector, respectively. According to the LaSalle's invariant set theorem, we know that all solutions of system 2.3 converge to Π, which induces the UE link flow pattern. Therefore, dynamic class-specific path flow pattern with any initial state induces the multiclass user equilibrium link flow pattern by the day-to-day route adjustment process. Similar analysis can be conducted for the case with elastic demand. In this case, the static multiclass traffic assignment problem with elastic demand can be formulated as the following equivalent minimization problem 24 : 
3.14
The multiclass UE path flow S {f ∈ R n |V f 0} is the largest invariant set. It is clear that, V f > 0 for all f ∈ Ω \ S, and V f 0 for all f ∈ S. Therefore V f is a Lyapunov function candidate of system 2.3 . By direct calibration, we know, for all f ∈ Ω, which implies that V f is a Lyapunov function of system 2.3 . From LaSalle's invariant set theorem, we have the following stability property for the dynamic system with heterogeneous users. Although the route adjustment behavior assumption is relaxed to consider the heterogeneity of travelers, that is to say the individual traveler adjusts his/her route choice based on his/her own perception, the multiclass UE link flow pattern is obtained. 
